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Happiness in philosophical ethics and utility or satisfaction in economics have much in 
common. The paper investigates the ethical economy of happiness as a joint topic of ethical 
and economic theory. It shows that limits of the calculus of utility maximization also apply 
to concepts of the greatest happiness in philosophy: It is impossible to distinguish the utility 
or happiness maximizing life strategy. The paper discusses the problem of inter-personal 
comparisons of happiness and satisfaction and the relevance of the theory of material value 
qualities developed by Max Scheler’s non-formal, material value ethics for the theory of 
goods, private and public. Ethics and economics are concerned with rules and duties. It is, 
however, also necessary to develop a theory of goods and values. Reflections are also made 
on the relationship between fact and value. Since there are side-effects of facts or 
experiences on our values, the naturalist fallacy of deriving value statements from 









 The economy of happiness is a topic at the intersection between philosophical ethics and 
economics. It raises two kinds of questions:  
Firstly: What is the economic impact on happiness? What is the impact of the nature of 
economic goods on happiness?  
And secondly: 
What is the internal economy of happiness as compared to the internal economy of 
utility? 
Happiness is a central topic of philosophy and philosophical ethics. It is the topic of 
ethics in the eudaemonistic tradition of ethics. In this tradition, the end and the criteria of 
ethics is eudaemonia, happiness. Full happiness, eudaemonia, is the last end of human life. 
The eudaemonia is the final end of human existence. 
Both, economics and eudaemonistic ethics, imply maximization principles. The 
maximization principles of economics are utility and profit maximization. For the consumer 
the rule is: Maximize utility! For the producer it is: Maximize profit! 
The maximization principle of eudaemonistic ethics is: As a human, maximize 
happiness as eudaemonia! 
Against both maximization principles in economics and in eudaemonistic ethics,  
simple o bjections from the critique of maximization theory must be made: It is very 
difficult to maximize a complex variable over a long period. We know how to maximize 
utility in local contexts but not in global contexts. Armen Alchian objected to the utility 
maximization principle of economics that the goal of maximizing utility requires a 
knowledge about the effects and side-effects of our actions that we do not have. 
When I sit down at the age of twenty and ask myself: How should I choose my 
profession, my wife, my location etc. to maximize my utility or my happiness over my life 
time I face several problems: I do not know how long I shall live, I do not know whom I 
shall meet as possible spouses, I do not know how the relative competitive position of 
professions in the market will develop in the future and the like. 
The result is that I cannot identify either a utility or a happiness maximizing strategy. I 
must find out what I like for the sake of its own and trust that what I like for the sake of its 
own will fit as a piece into the puzzle of life in which the things striven for their own sake add to a reasonable picture that is as a whole leading to happiness, but of which I shall 
never know whether it will realize the maximum happiness that was available to me.  
Max Scheler criticized hedonism by saying that one cannot attain happiness 
immediately but rather obtains it “on the back of other activities”. One does not play the 
piano in order to be happy; rather one can be happy when one knows how to play the piano. 
One’s interest in capitalizing immediately does not obtain the goal when one does not do 
things for their own sake. We can strive for happiness only by mediation of goals pursued 
for the sake of themselves. We cannot intend happiness immediately. We can only reach 
happiness by striving for something else.1  
The economic analogue is that we cannot realize profit immediately but only by 
producing something useful to someone. A firm that would market its employment chances 
to potential employees and its products to potential buyers by saying that its intention is to 
use both of them for profit maximization would not reach its goal. 
The argument against happiness and satisfaction as immediate human goals can also be 
turned the other way around. Assume someone strives for pleasure as the ultimate goal and 
reaches it by lowering the content of pleasure and happiness to such a low standard that he 
can reach it at any moment. This person would also raise our concern because she must 
have chosen a content of pleasure or happiness that is too easy to achieve. Plato argues in 
his Gorgias that a person interested only in happiness as satisfaction should best wish 
herself an itch or an eczema, so as to be better able to scratch herself and thereby to be in 
control of her satisfaction at any time. Similarly, Heraclitus objected to the notion that 
happiness consists only in the pleasures of the body that the ox who finds a pea would be 
the most happy being. 
                                                 
1 Cf. P.Koslowski,  Ethik des Kapitalismus. Mit einem Kommentar von James M. 
Buchanan, Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 1982, 6
th edition 1998. English translation: 
Ethics of Capitalism, in: P. Koslowski:  Ethics of Capitalism and Critique of 
Sociobiology. Two Essays with a Comment by James M. Buchanan, Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York, Tokyo (Springer) 1996 (= Studies in Economic Ethics and 
Philosophy, Vol. 10).  
  Spanish translation: Peter Koslowski: La Ética del Capitalismo, J. M. Buchanan: La 
Moralidad del Capitalismo, Madrid (Ediciones Rialp, S.A.) 1997. 
 The goal of the maximization of happiness is an over-stretch of our abilities to realize 
happiness. Happiness as mere corporeal pleasure is under-stretch of ability to realize 
happiness. Both approaches to happiness do not work. We expect happiness to be more 
than pleasure and we expect it to last for a long life. Solon of Athens postulated that we 
should not call anyone happy before the end of his life. If someone achieves everything but 
dies at a young age, we would not call this a happy life. It did not realize happiness over a 
time period long enough to be called a life of happiness.  
The Old Testament of the Bible encourages us to invest into wisdom since even if we 
lose some satisfaction in our young life we shall harvest the returns of wisdom in our old 
age when others who have not invested in wisdom will feel the weakness of their body and 
have no satisfaction at all whereas the wise person will harvest the joys of wisdom even 
when her body does not allow her anymore to enjoy the satisfaction of the body. It is an 
economy and inter-temporal exchange of satisfaction  and happiness: less corporeal 
pleasures at young age, more pleasures of the spirit and of wisdom in old age. This 
economy of happiness works only if I become old. If the wise dies at 40 he is cheated for 
the pleasures of young age and will never have harvested the pleasures of old age.  
This is one of the reasons why the ethical demand for longevity is so important: it 
stretches our time horizon and makes long lasting investment pay off whereas a short life 
does not encourage major investments. Capital formation and investment of high yield 
require Produktions-Umwege, deviations of production, as the Austrian theorist of capital, 
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, has emphasized. Deviations of production yield a higher return 
on investment, but require a longer time horizon and deferred gratification. The economy of 
happiness encourages such “deviations of productions” but it also renders us conscious of 
the fact that they only pay off if we are still alive when the returns accrue.   
Eudaemonistic ethics is a material ethics which gives a content of the ethical principle: 
happiness. Happiness is not a formal criterion of ethics like universalizability or 
generalizability. It has a degree of formality since we believe that everyone has the right to 
materialize by herself what is happiness for her. However, the character of this principle is 
less formal than universalizability or maximum coordination of individuals that form the 
basis of formal ethics. One reason for this higher degree of material content is that eudaemonia is a final end in 
itself, not a formal end for something else. Von Wright said that eudaemonia is the only end 
that is never anything except final. In the sequence of pleasure – joy – happiness, happiness 
is always the most final end, it is nothing but final. We use it as synonymous for “being the 
final end”. Only Kant has a concept that is even more final, the concept of 
“Glückswürdigkeit”, “being worthy of happiness”. Kant’s ethics is as is well known anti-
eudaemonistic in its character. Happiness cannot serve, as any other empirical concept, 
according to Kant, as a measure stick of morality. Whether a maxim and the act following 
from it contribute to my happiness is totally secondary to the question whether they follow 
the categorical imperative or not. Kant is, however, aware of the fact that if morality and 
happiness do not come together the motivation for morality suffers. Someone who would 
know that the moral option will always diminish his happiness has little incentive to follow 
it. Kant therefore assumes that we must believe or make ourselves believe into the 
congruence of morality and happiness. The total congruence of morality and advantage or 
moral action and the outcome of happiness is, however, a postulate not a certainty. The 
postulates of practical reason, God, immortality of the soul, and moral freedom, postulate a 
harmony between happiness and morality. The highest ideal of human existence is this 
harmony of happiness and morality in being morally worthy of happiness.  
That happiness follows morality is however only sure under the assumption of the 
retributive principle, the principle that God will retribute with heaven or hell our deeds in 
this life. The retributive principle is, for this reason, the most generally shared feature of the 
world religions: They all assume retribution after death. One could even say that the 
retributive principle is the very center of all world religions. 
Happiness is neither an empirical notion nor is it totally subjective. There is some 
degree of intersubjectivity in the concept of happiness, but it is a limited. As to the content 
of happiness each of us is a judge in his or her own matter. In contrast to the concept of 
pleasure and satisfaction there is, however, some intersubjectivity in happiness. The 
analytical philosopher Hare stated that the judgment: “Someone is a happy person” implies 
that one would be ready to change with him or her whereas this is not the case in the 
judgment: “Someone is satisfied”.  There is also some empirical content in the right estimation of chances for happiness: 
This estimation can be objectively wrong or false. Someone who thinks that he can 
subjectively become happy by using heroin is most likely to be objectively wrong.   
 
 
The Formal Ethics of Rules and the Non-Formal Ethics of Value Qualities2 
 
The rationality of formal ethics and economics follows two principles: individual 
maximization of the attainment of subjectively defined goals and the coordination of 
maximization. Coordination takes place as ethical coordination within the decision-maker 
by means of universalization, and as economic coordination externally from the decision-
maker by means of the price system. The formation of preferences is directed toward 
universalization, the economic coordination of preferences toward the ability of persons to 
co-exist. The content of the ethical will is formed, both in the formal ethics of rules and in 
the economic coordination of the price system, by general rules. Can the ethical side of the 
determination of the will, as it should guide ethics, consist only in the formal principle of 
universalization? If ethics should be determined only by the principle of the categorical 
imperative, is it underdetermined, because it not only, like economics, clarifies the question 
how I can best achieve that which I already intend here and now, and because it not only, 
like Kantian ethics, answers the question “What shall I do?” Ethics must instead also 
provide an answer to the question of what I should or can desire, if I have been conscious 
of myself over my will by taking distance and expanding the perspective of my self and the 
situation in which I stand. Ethics must seek to explain what a successful life is on the 
whole, not merely which actions are universalizable. Ethics serves to answer the question 
                                                 
2 Cf for the following P. Koslowski, Prinzipien der Ethischen Ökonomie. Grundlegung der 
Wirtschaftsethik und der auf die Ökonomie bezogenen Ethik, Tübingen (Mohr 
Siebeck) 1988, 2
nd edition1994. English translation: Principles of Ethical Economy, 
translated by David Lutz, Dordrecht, Boston, London (Kluwer Academic Publishers) 
2001 (Series„Issues in Business Ethics“, Vol. 17), paperback edition 2001. Partial 
Spanish translation:  Moralidad y eficiencia.  Lineas fundamentales de la etica 
economica, Seminario Permanente „Empresa y Humanismo“ de la Facultad de 
Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona 1988. 
 of what I actually do and can desire. It is not only a theory of duty, following rules, but also 
just as much a theory of the formation of the will, and a development therefore not only an 
order of a should, but also an order of desires and aspirations. 
Kant’s formal ethics is deontological ethics. The form of the will should, on its 
agreement with an undetermined should, investigated and in agreement to the categorical 
imperative. The main tradition of ethics, however, since its founding as in independent 
discipline by Aristotle, has been teleological ethics. The aspiration of the human person, in 
whom elements of will, habit, conduct, and inclination unite, the orexis of Aristotle, should 
be connected to the good and to a good/proper life. 
The idea that ethics is not only related to the will and the rules of obligation, but also 
just as much to the aspiration and the content of the aspiring and desiring good, must walk 
beside the idea of coordination of formal rule ethics and market economy. The desire and 
aspiration of the human person has ethically not only the co-ordinatability and 
universalizability of maxims of action as its object. The acting person must, rather, be in the 
position, to assess comprehensively (i.e. ethically, aesthetically, and economically), not just 
ethically or economically the question: What should I want? The question “What should 
and can I will or want?” is prior to the question “What should and may I do?” and should 
not be substituted by the latter. In order to be able to pose the rule-ethical question to the 
will, whether its maxim can be a principle of universal legislation, I must first know what I 
actually want, to which goals and goods I aspire. Only if I myself have become conscious 
about the content of my aspiration can I question the maxim of the action that is directed 
toward the realization of these goods on its ability to be coordinated with other aspirations. 
 
Ethical and Economic Theories of the Good 
 
From the perspective of a complete theory of ethics, one that grasps both formal rule 
ethics and material goods and value ethics, the content of the will and aspiration is of 
ethical significance. The desires and aspirations must be capable of deciding between goods 
and value-qualities, not only economically, but a lso ethically and aesthetically. The 
economic concept of the good is, first of all, no less formal than the rules of economic coordination. According to Richard Strigl, a good is defined by opening alternative utility 
possibilities.3 Alternative utility possibilities become a good or value for a subject that is 
determined in such and such a way, and that discovers and recognizes them for him/herself. 
If the alternative utility possibilities become such by the subject alone, what makes 
something an economic good depends upon the subject’s assessment. For economics, the 
question about the good stops at this point. What it is that in the subject that makes such a 
thing a utility possibility is, for economics, a black box, which is not to be questioned 
further, but instead taken for granted. According to revealed preference theory, economics, 
whose job it is only to coordinate the preferences, does not need to be interested in the 
interiority of preference formation. 
For ethics, however, the formation of preferences and development of the perception of 
value-qualities and utility possibilities is precisely the real job. The good of economics may 
consist in opening alternative utility possibilities. But if this good, enters into ethics, which 
seeks to illuminate the process of preference formation and to expand the ability to perceive 
utility possibilities, in order to pre-coordinate the social coordination of the preferences of 
economics, it cannot be defined again by alternative utility possibilities, without an infinite 
regress. Economics coordinates the use of goods whose utility possibilities are seen as 
optional and subjective, whose character as goods follows from subjective preferences. 
Ethics, as the illumination and coordination of these preferences, cannot, with the 
determination of the good and preferences for the good again answer the question, what the 
good should be and for what the alternative utilitiy possibilities should be good, “for 
alternative utility possibilities.” Sometime the definition of good as “good for something 
else” must come to the point where the good itself is reached. 
 
The Theory of the Highest Good 
 
In ethical tradition, two types of theories can be distinguished, which come out of the 
in-itself-circles of the concept of economic good as alternative utility possibilities to a 
                                                 
3 Cited by Hans Albert, Marktsoziologie und Entscheidungslogik (Neuwied, 1967), p. 42. substantial concept of the goods or good in itself. The first type is described by the theory 
of the highest good, in which the good in itself, which is not only good for something else, 
is taken hold of as the highest good. The other type of theory of the good is material value 
ethics, which attempts to develop final kinds of goods and values, or good- and value-
qualities, that cannot be traced back further to other possibilities of assessment and utility. 
According to the tradition of the ethics of the highest good, all individual goods are 
related to a final and highest good. The individual goods receive their character of the good 
from their relation to and their beneficence for the highest good. Goods are, in this 
perspective, not defined by alternative utility possibilities, which are once again good for 
other utility possibilities, but instead by their contribution toward the attainment of the 
highest good. This highest good can, as with eudaimonism, be determined as individual 
blissfulness (Greek, eudaimonia). 
Eudaimonistic ethics makes all goods means to the attainment of the highest good. Its 
weakness is that it must render instrumental all good- and value-qualities other than 
blissfulness itself, and that it is not able to accomplish the concrete mediation between the 
final goal of the highest good and the subordinate goods, the answer to the question of how 
one must utilize all interim goods for the highest good. Eudaimonistic ethics contradicts the 
feeling for the self-worth character of goods and actions and the wish for concretization of 
action strategies for the highest good. In addition, eudaimonism is able to accomplish only 
difficultly the social-ethical mediation of the pursuit of happiness of the individual with 
those of everyone else. The coordination of the individual pursuit of happiness of everyone 
is not satisfactorily solved in eudaimonistic ethics. Eudaimonism is solipsistic. The modern 
problem of the union of the pursuit of happiness of the independent being, the ability to 
coordinate the pursuit of happiness of all human persons, remains underdetermined. 
The Aristotelian, eudaimonistic theory of the highest good has the advantage, relative to 
the ethics of universalization, of subsuming goods under a final goal. The material quality 
of the good itself and the goods, that which makes the individual good the good for me, 
threatens, however, as with the economic concept of value, to become lost in the relation to 
the other, in relationality. The materiality of the good and the qualities of goods are in 
danger, to be lost in the relational definition of being the means for the highest good and in sharing the instrumental character for the highest good. The material value qualities of the 
content of the will and the quality of that which becomes the object of the will is, of course, 
also in ethics, as with all recognitions of qualities, philosophically problematic, since 
qualities are only partially universalizable. The material value ethic of Max  Scheler 
attempts to accomplish precisely this difficult task of thinking qualities of the good and of  
knowledge of the materiality of value-qualities. 
 
1.2. The Non-Formal Ethics of Values 
 
Scheler’s non-formal ethics of values is an approach to ethics that seeks to go beyond 
both the relational character of the ethical theory of the highest good and the economic 
theory of goods and values of the good as alternative utility possibilities, to each/every 
good, that are not goods for the highest good and to each/every value-quality, that are not 
only value for others, thus exchange value or use value alternative utility possibilities for 
others. The non-formal ethics of values stops the outer-relatedness and iteration of the 
economic category of values, in which a value is always valuable only for something else, 
and seeks to define values as qualities in themselves, as a priori value-qualities or value-
modalities. Scheler’s approach makes recognizable that in the aspiration for goods 
something other than the mere aspiration for utility possibilities is expressed. In the striving 
for genuine goods, the aspiration to experience goods as such and the will to realize good-
qualities in and for themselves is shown. No one maximizes utility for the sake of utility, 
because no one wants to have utility. One wants to have something definite, which can be 
understood as utility, in common with everything else one wants, only in a very distant 
abstraction. To call the pursuit of all of the good-qualities that someone wants  the 
“maximization of utility” is a metaphorical way of speaking. Utility stands for everything 
that the acting person actually wants. 
The non-formal ethics of values seeks to determine what is aspired as itself in its non-
formal quality and not in its formal abstraction as utility or as universality of the maxim. 
According to Scheler, the value-qualities of goods can be distinguished according to the 
fundamental value modalities of the pleasant, the useful, the noble, and the holy, whereby this sequence depicts a ranking of values from the lowest value of pleasure to the highest of 
holiness.4 The value-qualities declare/set/report what is aspired to in the goods and what 
constitutes the good of the goods. They do not portray alternative utility- or utilization-
viewpoints, but instead represent the a priori qualities of the good itself, which form the last 
will- and aspiration-goals and between which  – and not between alternative utility 
possibilities – the choice acts of preference take place. To classify a good as more valuable 
than another means to assess the others as lower and to weigh their realization or their 
existence as less important. The other goods and values are determined to be less valuable 
than the chosen value and are placed below it. To emphasize the value of the noble and to 
make the noble the goal of one’s own actions and the standard of one’s evaluation of a 
good is to place the pleasant and the useful below the noble. 
According to Scheler, however, the higher value does not attain its higher rank from the 
preference actions of the human person, from the “preference” for the “noble” utility 
possibility, but instead from the intrinsic characteristic of the value itself. The value is not 
created by the subjectivity of the human person; the value-quality exists and is preferred 
and actualized by the subjectivity of the person. The higher value reveals its greater degree 
of value, according to Scheler, by not using itself up, like values of pleasure, by not 
wearing out like the sensory values, and by not calculating like the values of the useful. If 
one uses, going beyond Scheler, the conceptualization of the economic theory of public 
goods, the phenomenon of the greater degree of value can also be expressed thus: The 
higher value reveals its higher rank and superiority in being a public good in a greater 
measure and showing a higher degree of publicness than the lower values. The higher value 
carries the stigma of freedom, and all the stronger so, the higher its value rank. Value-
characteristics a nd virtues such as friendship, kindness, unselfishness, justice, courage, 
love, and faith cannot be compelled or be brought about by rules. Likewise, the highest 
mental values and goods, such as those of art, science, and religion, cannot be produced and 
reproduced in the strict sense. They are, instead, the result of free dedication/devotion and 
of being “affectedness”. They move and motivate by their greater value rank. It follows 
                                                 
4 Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings 
and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, 1973), pp. 111. from their higher value-quality, relative to mere material goods, that all  goods bearing 
higher value-qualities are felt as enduring, and lead to deeper meaning fulfillment and 
satisfaction and to a lesser degree of exclusion of others than the material goods of the 
useful and the pleasant. They are in their character “more open” and more inclusive than 
goods of lower value-quality. 
The ability to perceive and experience higher value-qualities requires, however, a 
corresponding  experience of the forms of the freedom of human potential, which is at its 
core an ethical experience and inclination and not merely a decision of the will for a 
universalizable maxim. The ability to experience the higher value does not appear on its 
own, but instead requires practice or exercise of a kind that develops empathy in the higher 
value, requires “asceticism” (i.e. in the original meaning of the word “exercise”). When this 
exercise is required in the ability to experience the higher value, it develops its own action-
guiding gravitational force: “Some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by 
their own worth.”5 By the power of its nature, the higher value wins us; by its dignity, it 
pulls us into its spell. It is the higher value, according to Scheler,6 that assigns to the lower 
the space appropriate to it, thereby in this sense sustaining it and in the process determining 
the order of the preferences and the followers in the concrete situation.7 
 
Value-Experiencing and Cultural Sense-Understanding 
 
Scheler’s rank-ordering of the values shows that his theory is an ethical theory. It is not 
only a theory of the Understanding of value-qualities, but also a theory of the preference-
ordering of values. The necessity to develop the ability to perceive and understand, and the 
necessity that the acting person expresses his/her opinion concerning the goods and value-
qualities, refers to the close relationship between ethics, aesthetics, and cultural philosophy. 
The experience of value-qualities is bound to the development of the ability to experience, 
                                                 
5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 145, a. 1. 
6 Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, pp.114-16. 
7 Cf. Wilhelm Korff, “Ethische Entscheidungskonflikte,” in Handbuch der christlichen Ethik 
(Freiburg and Gütersloh, 1982), Vol. III, p. 79. to express one’s self, and to understand. Spranger’s theory of understanding is helpful here. 
Dilthey defines the understanding as circulation of the experience of the artist, of the 
expression of his experience in art and the reexperience of the experience of the artist by 
the observer.8 This circulation of the understanding demonstrates the closeness of non-
formal ethics and culture, of value- and expression-understanding. Taking position means, 
according to Spranger, the motto of the mental world: the ability to accept and to reject.9 
Expressing one’s opinion is also in the non-formal ethics of value a key concept: It is 
impossible to perceive the value-qualities of the higher vital and mental values without 
expressing one’s opinion. 
The economy, along with science and art, forms one of the three chief spheres of 
culture. These cultural spheres are characterized by each characteristic intention of acts of 
building itself up. In the three cultural spheres -- the economy, science, and art -- the acts or 
actions of the human person are directed, in specific intentions, toward definite goods and 
value-qualities. They are directed toward the economic, theoretic, or aesthetic value that in 
the sphere of the things corresponds to the consumption, knowledge, and art goods. To be 
able to take position to the meaning of the economy, of science, and of art in the proper 
way is an essential achievement in the realization of the mental life and of human 
happiness.10 Teaching others how to attain this ability is the task of training and education. 
Training takes place in the presentation of meaning to the inner learning. Education takes 
place in the forming of one’s own nature, which takes place in sense-understanding, value-
experiencing, self-reflecting, and self-deciding. 
The theory of the understanding of the meaning of the mental and cultural sciences is 
closely related to the theory of the non-formal ethics of values, understood as the theory of 
the preference for value-qualities. They show, together, that understanding and preferring 
                                                 
8 Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften 
(Frankfurt, 1981), pp. 235 ff. See also Eduard Spranger, “Wilhelm Dilthey,” in Spranger, Vom 
pädagogischen Genius (Heidelberg, 1965), pp. 209-10. 
9 Eduard Spranger, “Vom Wesen des Geistigen,” in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Hans Walter 
Bähr (Tübingen, 1980), Vol. VI, p. 307. Even earlier, Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und 
Naturwissenschaft (Tübingen, 1899), pp. 42-43:  
10 Cf. Spranger, “Vom Wesen des Geistigen,” p. 301. goods and training for the perception of value-qualities that goods possess are prior to the 
outer and inner coordination. The non-formal ethics of values and the theory of 
understanding the meaning of goods and values are both economics, which is oriented 
toward the coordination of preferences, and formal ethics, which seeks to achieve the 
internal formation of preferences according to the law of their ability to be coordinated with 
other preferences. First, when value-qualities are perceived and experienced, preferences 
can be formed.  Then, in a second step, these preferences can be coordinated by the 
universalization principle. The non-formal ethics of values, as a theory of teleological 
ethics, intersects in the same way with the economic theory of goods as the theory of the 
useful, and with the aesthetic theory of the value of the beautiful. In the goods-theory or 
non-formal ethics, economic, ethical, and aesthetic sense-understanding, value-
experiencing, and self-deciding penetrate each other. The alternative utility possibilities of 
the economical good are not already here in themselves by the physical existence of the 
good. Their superiority to the utility possibilities of the lower values of the sensory-pleasant 
and the useful must first be experienced, understood, and realized by  the opinion-
expressing subject. 
In the sense-understanding and value-experience of material value-qualities of a good, 
there exist mutual effects between experiences and value-convictions, between the real 
existence of a good and the evaluation of it. These mutual effects sublate the familiar 
distinction of “is” and “ought.” Experiences of things have an effect on the value-
experience; the ability to judge and experience value-qualities reacts on the experience of 
things or economic goods. The alternative u tility possibilities of a good are not given, but 
instead depend on the ability of the user to utilize them, on his/her ability to perceive and 
experience, on the formation of his/her receptivity for non-formal value-qualities. 
The economic value of a good is not independent of its aesthetic, ethical, and cultural 
value. Understanding an economic good and using it efficiently require (if it is more than a 
trivial, consumer good), that the user has at his/her disposal the ability to experience and 
assess, in order to understand the higher non-formal value-qualities and to use them 
ethically-aesthetically-economically. The qualities of the good must be experienced, 
expressed, and imparted to the addressee, the consumer. Economic action has in common with artistic action the circulation of the experience and its expression by the producer and 
the reexperience and understanding by the recipient. Above and beyond the demands that 
confront the artist, the economic producer must also ensure that the circulation of 
understanding between the producer’s experience and expression of the experience and the 
consumer/recipient’s after-effect and understanding of the expression also actually ensures, 
by suitable forms of marketing, that the consumer/recipient “understands” the producer. In 
his/her experience and expressions of the qualities of a good, the economic producer must 
include the recipient in a greater measure in the process than the artistic and the scientific 
producer. 
 
Side Effects between Experiences and Value Convictions, “Is” and “Ought” 
 
The non-formal ethics of values shows that there exists no complete separation between 
experiences and value-convictions in the area of the higher mental and vital values and 
good and, therefore, also that no strict separation between formal and non-formal principles 
of ethics is possible. The content of the maxim that should become the universal principle is 
already characterized by non-formal value-qualities in its being experienced and being 
understood. The ability to experience determines the experiences and the actions, as 
likewise the experiences and the experience of the effects of one’s own actions on others 
and the environment react on the acting person’s ethical and aesthetic ability to experience 
and value-convictions. A complete separation between “is” and “ought”, between 
economics, on one hand, and ethics and aesthetics, on the other, is impossible. 
Physical side effects of our actions are able to change our value-convictions. We change 
our value-convictions and normative statements about the side effects of our actions and 
about the effects of those value convictions that we previously had, when the experience of 
the consequences of our values elicits/provokes serious value-arguments and fact-
arguments for a change of our value-convictions. The side effects of our actions and our 
life-leading on us self and the reality about us change our previous value-convictions, as 
likewise an insistence on one’s own value-convictions is ethically demanded, when the 
reality of our value-convictions demands an ethical stance towards the external reality. The acting person acts into an outer world, one whose factors are subject to their own 
laws. It is true of our goal-directed actions that what is actually attained never completely 
agrees with our previous conceptions of our success. The discrepancy between willing and 
accomplishing is no merely psychological phenomenon, but a phenomenon at the border 
between the way of the world and the process of perceiving the way of the world. The gap 
between will and accomplishment is a realization and expression about events with the 
clash between subject and objective way of the world, between imaginations, 
establishments of objectives, and assessments of the way of the world and its actual 
course.11 
All undesired side effects have in common that they subsequently react as correcting 
the will, its emotional, evaluative, and objective elements, and on the consciousness of the 
willing and acting subject. What Max Weber held to be impossible, that the value-attitude 
is reconstructed by recognition of that in the mental world which follows from the action in 
accordance with the predetermined value-attitude, takes place by the side effects of actions 
and the discrepancy between will and accomplishment.12 It is impossible that value-
convictions change only as a result of changes within the sphere of values, because the 
sphere of values is directed toward the sphere of facts. Value convictions must be 
changeable by side effects, because otherwise the consequence would be a complete 
solipsism, a window-less monadism of the individual sphere of value. The most important 
case of a correction of one’s own goal-setting and value-acting as a result of the experience 
of the success of one’s own actions is that of conviction-change and changing of the 
standards of value elicited by suffering the effects of one’s own actions. The genuine 
revolutions of the inner person are those that are provoked by the reaction of one’s own 
action on the complete attitude of the person.13 The phenomenon of the transformation of 
the “I” and its values by facts and experiences sublates the supposedly-clear separation of 
                                                 
11 Cf. Wilhelm Wundt, System der Philosophie (Leipzig, 1889), Vol. I, p. 337. 
12 Cf. Spranger, Das Gesetz der ungewollten Nebenwirkungen in der Erziehung, 6th Ed. 
(Heidelberg, 1960), p. 101. See also Otto Bollnow, Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik , 5th Ed. 
(Stuttgart, 1977), pp. 105 ff. 
13 Cf. Spranger, Ibid., pp. 94-95. “is” and “ought” statements. Arguments about facts and values, about economic and ethical 
points of view, are not completely separable, but are instead interdependent, and have side 
effects on one another. Merely understanding existing facts and contexts of culture and the 
social institutions without guiding and tacit values is already impossible. Therefore, 
economic considerations can also influence changes of attitude, and changes in attitude can 
change economic arguments. The two strands of reflection do not run independently of one 
another, but instead beside one another in parallel. For example, on the basis of cost 
considerations (i.e. economic side effects), in the public health service, certain procedures 
can be excluded from general use and the value of “equal treatment” be restricted for 
economic reasons, when the efficiency of measures is low and the social total return does 
not increase in the same amount with increasing universalization of the procedures. On the 
other hand, in questions of fundamental life interests and health, cost view points in 
medical care must be set aside by value-convictions as irrelevant and unethical. 
Ethics, in the comprehensive sense, cannot accept an opposition of conviction 
(morality) and success orientation (economics), the world of facts and the world of values. 
Success and side effects are likewise to be observed and in the conviction to be accepted as 
the consequences by evaluation first to that become what they are: not mere events, but 
effects of actions. The decision-maker must ex ante design and assess the value of his 
strategies, the possible environmental events, and the consequences of his actions from 
preference rules or perspectives, from value points of view. Values are not objective 
constructions, but instead perspectives, perceptions of preferences. 
A person’s value perspectives form the foundation for describing the i nfluence that 
expectations and imaginations of the future have on his present choice acts. Social values 
describe how a social group wants the future to influence a person’s choice actions. Ethical 
values are values that can be universalized and agreed with, that the individual makes his 
own as evaluating the future in his choice actions, and about which rational discourse is 
possible. The acting person selects his strategies from the “possible worlds” that his actions 
will bring about, according to preference points of view. Choice acts/actions are not choices 
between actual states of the world or events, but between ideas of states of the world. The acting person does not select between acts, but between imaginations and ideas of acts.14 
Since choice acts take place in the sphere of representation and of the imagination just as 
they do in the world of actual events, reality and the representation of reality, “is” and 
“ought” statements, presuppose one another. That the acting person chooses between 
possible worlds is true of all choice acts of greater range, for economic, ethical, and 
political choice acts. The choosing person imagines  ex ante possible worlds, whose 
realizations ex post by himself and others are evaluated according to success and action-
guiding motives and values. 
 
Non-Formal Value-Qualities and Degrees of Publicness of Goods 
 
The rationality of formal ethics and economics follows the logic of maximization and 
the coordination of maximization. The content of the maximandum that the individual sets 
for his/her rational actions is, for formal ethics and economics, not relevant. Only the form 
of the maximization’s ability to exist with other maximizations is of ethical and economic 
significance. For formal ethics and economics, it is also not significant whether the content 
and the non-formal value-quality of the goods has ethical and social-economic side effects 
on the form of coordination and the social uniting of individuals beyond market exchange. 
Economic theory recognizes only one case in which the non-formal content of goods is of 
significance for socio-economic coordination, the case of the public good. The public good 
brings about, by its non-formal characteristics, a failure of market coordination. Its 
publicity is its specific non-formal value-quality. According to the economic theory of 
public goods, the non-formal characteristics of a good, not the utility possibilities 
subjectively related to it, determine whether a good is private or public (i.e. able or unable 
to exclude rivaling consumption with other goods) and, therefore, whether it permits market 
coordination or makes it impossible, or least more difficult. The non-applicability of the 
exclusion principle implies that non-paying consumers cannot be excluded from 
consumption of the good. The non-competition of consumption involves that the 
                                                 
14 Cf. G. L. S. Shackle, Imagination and the Nature of Choice (Edinburgh, 1979), pp. 2 ff. consumption of one good does not compete with the consumption of the other, that the 
consumption of one does not reduce that of the other. An example of a public good, in this 
sense, is the good of national defense, from which non-payers cannot be excluded and with 
which, therefore, market coordination is impossible.15 
In the theory of market failure, a dichotomy between private good and public goods is 
generally observed, which does not do justice to the actual continuum from completely 
private goods to completely public goods. the theory of merit goods is not an exception, 
because it sees merit goods as private goods that are produced publicly.16 
The problem of public goods refers to the economic relevance of non-formal goods 
theory and value theory, because the non-formal characteristics of goods, their “publicity,” 
changes the way in which they are economically coordinated. The theory of non-formal 
goods reacts here directly on economic theory, and the goods-qualities directly on the 
manner of goods coordination. It can be seen at this point not only that the non-formal 
goods theory is economically and ethically relevant in the dichotomy of “public” and 
“private” goods, but also that wide-ranging conclusions for the relationship of the non-
formal ethics of goods and values and economic coordination can be drawn from this 
phenomenon. The non-formal goods-qualities and, therefore, the non-formal ethics of 
values exert not only an influence indirectly,  as ethics, the way of the economic 
coordination as it is the case in formal ethics. The formal rule ethics, as pre-coordination of 
preferences, influences and pre-coordinates the economic coordination of the price system. 
The non-formal ethics of value and goods changes the perception of goods qualities and 
changes, therefore, immediately the economic ways of coordination. Value-qualities exert 
an immediate influence on the form of economic coordination, because the higher rank of 
value-modalities, whose bearer is a good, not only elicits/provokes a perception of higher 
value-qualities with the user of a bearer-good, but also changes the way of using and the 
scarcity relationship for goods on the whole. The higher value is less competitive and 
                                                 
15 On the theory of “public goods,” see Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public 
Finance in Theory and Practice, 2nd Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J, 1976), pp. 49 ff. 
16 An example of a merit good is free, public education, which is produced publicly, but whose 
goods are appropriated privately. exclusive in c onsumption than the lower value. It proves its higher rank by not being 
competitive in consumption. The higher value reveals its higher rank in it that, in contrast 
to non-formal values, it is not used up (in economic terms, does not demonstrate non-
competitiveness of consumption), that in contrast to moral values, it does not wear out (is 
not subjected to diminishing marginal utility), and in contrast to the values of the useful, 
cannot miscalculate (does not permits clear exclusion). The higher value requires a 
different experience of use and coordination than does the lower value, because it is not 
used up, is not worn out, and does not miscalculate. Its economic characteristics of non-
competition, constant marginal utility, and the impossibility of exclusion make a way of 
production determined purely by immediate self-interest and a purely private-economic 
way of coordination inefficient. The manner of market coordination must be appropriate to 
the nature of the higher value-qualities. Mere self-interest would, because of the lacking 
exclusivability of non-paying consumers with non-modified price control, lead to an under-
production of the higher value, or public good. 
It is of great importance, however, that, just as the value-qualities range from the lowest 
to the highest value, their bearers, the goods corresponding to them, also range from private 
through the more public to the public goods. The highest value of the holy is not to be 
perceived in its ability, but in its effect on the environment as the most public value. With 
the higher value modalities, as the value level increases, their effects take on a growing 
public and collective character. The ability to mediate or to be perceived, on the contrary, 
decreases with increasing value level. With the higher values, the individual’s perception of 
utility and actual public utility can diverge, if formation and experience ability of the 
person are not so widely spread and trained that they are able to perceive the public 
character of the highest values. Certain personal value-qualities or virtues, such as courage, 
kindness, justice, etc., and certain mental values and goods, such as art, science, and 
religion, are difficult to calculate, demonstrate more slowly diminishing marginal utility 
and lower wearing out than moral goods or using themselves up, because their 
“consumption” compete with the consumption of others to a smaller degree than those of 
material goods. Mental goods, such as art and science, and personal virtues, such as kindness and 
courage, are neither completely public nor completely private goods, but instead 
demonstrate degrees of publicity. The must be acquired privately by effort and education. 
Their utility, however, goes above and beyond their private acquisition. They cause public 
side effects or spillovers, because they do not lose anything and are not worn out when they 
are used. A great work of art loses none of its value when millions of people look at it. The 
virtue of justice is not used up when it is called into action. A truly great book gains the 
more often it is read. 
The virtues and the mental goods are goods with a public character, or of a semi-public, 
semi-private nature. They are of significance economically in two different respects, and in 
the post-industrial and post-modern economy in increasing measure. It has a great impact 
on our happiness if we are able to shift our consumption from the rivaling to the non-
rivaling goods. An ethics of consumption encourages as Adela Cortina has shown the shift 
in consumption from the private to the more public goods and value qualities.  
On one hand, semi-public goods change with growing distribution, the relationship of 
resource consuming to resource conserving goods in the economic output. On the other 
hand, they facilitate social coordination and cohesion, because they help to produce the 
public good or capital of the validity of the ethical rules and trust in their validity. 
The mental goods, which are produced privately and acquired publicly, demonstrate the 
characteristics of higher values noted above: not using themselves up, not wearing out, and 
non-competitive consumption. At the same time, they are goods, for whose production and 
consumption smaller quantities of natural, non-renewable resources are necessary. 
Therefore, in a world of exhaustible resources, their production can be ensured for a longer 
time than those of non-formal goods, because mental and cultural goods require smaller 
quantities of exhaustible resources. But their consumption also requires lower costs order to 
facilitate general consumption generally, and reduced quantities of the concerned good, 
because the consumption of one does not drive out consumption of others. Cultural goods 
are not used up when they are consumed, though, of course, even with them, as with other 
public goods, a problem similar to that of the competition of consumption can arise: the 
problem of congestion. Congestion in the use of a public good can lead to the necessity of exclusion 
mechanisms and rationing, which shifts the public good’s character in the direction of a 
semi-private, semi-competitive, or semi-exclusive good. Nevertheless, the shifting of 
preferences from competitive private goods to less-competitive public goods remains a 
crucial development-potential of the post-modern society in the change from the 
commercial to the cultural society. In the transition from the commercial and consumer 
society to the cultural society, the theory of semi-public goods and non-formal value-
qualities receive their resource-economic foundation. The consumption of culture  – in 
contrast to the consumption of non-formal goods – demonstrates environmental-economic 
side effects. Culture is more conservative of resources than are the leisure and consumption 
habits of certain sports, such as automobile racing, skiing, etc. 
In the fact that higher value-qualities and goods are not used up by being perceived and 
experienced, one can see not only that the “economic” characteristic of these goods is one 
of non-competitiveness, but also at the same time their potential for bringing about social 
cohesion. Higher value-qualities and the consumption of mental goods demonstrate not 
only the characteristic that consumption of them does not lead to competition (i.e. that no 
side effect analogous to a quasi-externality of consumption arises), that consumption of 
them by one person does not reduce the amount available for others. Higher value-qualities 
also demonstrate, going beyond non-competition of consumption, that use by one person 
and use by others could be regarded as indifference, the positive side effect, that as they are 
consumed they do not bring about division, but cohesion of their “consumers.” While the 
consumption of non-formal, private goods and the realization of their value-qualities brings 
about s ocial division, the perception and realization of higher value-qualities by the 
individual leads to cohesion with others who also perceive these value-qualities. 
In the economy of happiness, the choice of the goods to which we aspire plays a central 
role. If we are able to realize the higher value qualities we are able to realize less rivalry of 
consumption and therefore less conflict. The economic impact of this economy of 
happiness is considerable. It might be more economical to shift to these goods than to 
increase the total output of goods. The economy of happiness demonstrates, however, that 
also economic considerations are not alien to the ethics of happiness. Since our resources for happiness are limited we have to make economic use of them. A better understanding of 
the economy of public goods makes as understand better the mechanics of happiness. 
Voltaire’s saying that most people are either not intelligent enough or not stupid enough to 
be happy might touch on cynicism but it is right in pointing to the fact that happiness, as the 
whole eudaemonistic tradition was convinced of, has something to do with intelligence. 
Understanding the economy of happiness increases the chances for happiness. There is, as 
the theory of ethical economy in its application to the problem of happiness shows, no final 
contradiction between the ethics and the economy of happiness. 